A polemic against my article "I'm a Croatian Serb!"
This is the polemic against my article I'm a Croatian Serb!, as posted in the Facebook group Ja Sam Iz Cetnicke Familije/I'm From a Chetnik Family by Dušan Ivančević. My quotes are in italics, while his responses are immediately below each:
In regrds to the article "Croatian Serbs"
“The identity of these Serbs has been forged by history and to a great extent by the politics of various rulers from different eras.”
Is the author trying to say that the Krajina Serbs became just that because of history and politics? That they weren’t Serbs at some point in time?
“Fundamentally, it is based on Orthodox Christian faith and culturally represented by numerous customs and traditions, many of them originating from Orthodoxy, while others vary upon region.”
Can we assume that the author is saying that, Krajina Serbs are not really Serbs but they are of people who are primarily Orthodox? Notice how the name SERB was left out of the phrase Orthodox Christians.
“My people are primarily descendants of Orthodox pastoral warriors (referred to by various names, including ‘Vlachs’, ‘Rascians’ and even ‘Illyrians’)”
This statement confirms my questions regarding the author’s intent.
“brought over and settled into the designated Vojna Krajina by the Catholic Habsburg Monarchy in order to repel further attacks and invasions by the MuslimOttoman Turks into central Europe. Our earliest recorded sightings in modern-day Croatia can be traced to the Middle ages, while our presence continued to grow since then thanks to multiple waves of Orthodox Slavs arriving from the Islamic Ottoman Empire in the 16th and 17th centuries.”
According to many ancient historians, Serbs were settled in Southern Lika and Northern Dalmatia long before the Croats came to those regions. The author is clearly saying that this was Croatian land that a Catholic Empire gave to the Serbs.
“It was brought to Yugoslavia in 1941 with Nazi Germany’s invasion of the country, bringing with it fascist régimes like that of Ante Pavelić and his Ustaše, who committed a horrendous genocide upon Serbs and other non-Croats within their puppet-state known as the ‘Independent State of Croatia’.”
The Germans did not bring the Ustaše. The Ustaše were already existent in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and were supported by the Communist Party of Yugoslavia.
“Like the Nazis throughout Europe, the Ustaše also ran concentration camps within their puppet state, the most notorious one being the Jasenovac concentration camp, in which the death toll has been variously estimated between tens of thousands and hundreds of thousands.”
This statement glosses over the number of Ustaša victims which I would consider an open door for revisionists.
“This apocalyptic war also divided Serbs into two rival camps: the communist, multi-ethnic Partisan movement, under the leadership of Marshall Tito, and the anti-communist, Serb-dominated Chetnik movement, formed out of the remnants of the Yugoslav Royal Army.”
This is also incorrect. The Yugoslavian Army in the Homeland was far more multi-ethnic than the Partizan paramilitary which consisted of about 95% Serbs, while the remainder being the head of the CPY were Croatian. These percentages of Serbs vs. Croat in the Partizan paramilitary did not change until 1943, when Italy capitulated, and hordes of Ustaše, both Croatian and “Bosnian” massively began switching over to the Partizan side.
“Both of these camps fought against the Ustaše, but also against each other, often pitting brother against brother, and even father against son. The war ended with the Partizans’ complete victory over German and Italian occupiers and over all rival forces in the country.”
Not true. Very few battles were fought between Partizans and Ustaše and practically none with the Germans . The battles were almost entirely Partizans and Ustaše or Partizans and Nazis against Mihailovich’s forces. Furthermore, the Partizans did not achieve complete victory over German occupiers. The Red Army did. Italy capitulated in 1943 to the Allies, not the Partizan paramilitary.
“I understand why Serbs and Croats talk, write and think in the conflicting ways they do. All this affects me very deeply as I am also a Serb from Croatia — or a ‘Croatian Serb’ — even though I don’t live there for most of the year.”
I’ve yet to hear a combatant from Lika or Dalmatia from that war consider themselves Croatian Serbs.
"The intention on the part of the ethnic Serb ‘rebels’ (as they were labelled by the Croatian media at the time, and still are today) was to either stay within the Yugoslav federation, or along with Serbia form a ‘Greater Serbia’, for which they received political and military support from Slobodan Milošević’s régime in Belgrade. A year earlier, ethnic Serbs showed their opposition to Croatia’s aspiration to seceed in protests that have been branded the ‘Log revolution’, for their use of timber to blockade roads connecting Serb-populated areas to the rest of Croatia. In relation to the outside world, the Republic of Croatia received international recognition, whereas Republika Srpska Krajina received none. Nevertheless, full-scale war erupted in August ’91, which brought about the displacement of over 100,000 Croats and other non-Serbs from their homes. This displacement, accompanied by destruction of property, violence and even murders of civilians, is considered an act of ‘ethnic cleansing’, as its aim was to remove ethnic Croats from the region. However, the Krajina-Serb authorities justified this act, claiming it was necessary for the “protection” and “security” of the ethnic Serb population in that same region. “
In this entire paragraph there is not one mention of Croatian pogroms against Serbian civilians prior to the out brake of war.
21 August at 06:44
This is my response to his polemic reposted at the General Mihailovich blog:
Alan Jakšić said...
Dušane, thank you for taking the time to read my article about Serbs from modern-day Croatia or Croatian Serbs. About its two versions: I originally received a fair amount of stick for using the term "Croatian Serbs" in the original. So when the article got published in Britić, I intended to edit it as quickly as I could, so as to reduce the frequency of that disputed term therein.
Just to clarify a few things: My article about Serbs from Croatia, or Croatian Serbs, is supposed to serve as an introduction to the issues that concern this population, to which I personally belong. It's not meant to be a in-depth, detailed look at our entire history and our customs.
I understand your concern when you complain that, "…there is not one mention of Croatian pogroms against Serbian civilians prior to the outbreak of war", and that, "This statement glosses over the number of Ustaša victims which I would consider an open door for revisionists". But like I mention above, my article is merely an introduction with the aim to inspire further interest and research into issues that concerns Serbs in Lika, Dalmatia, etc. That's all.
You criticise my use of the word "bring" in the sentence: "It was brought to Yugoslavia in 1941 with Nazi Germany’s invasion of the country, bringing with it fascist régimes like that of Ante Pavelić and his Ustaše…". However, I never in the slightest suggested that the Ustaše weren't already extant within Yugoslavia prior to the German invasion; just that the Nazis invaded and the Ustaša régime was established following their arrival. That's it.
You also feel the need to correct me when you explain: "The Yugoslavian Army in the Homeland was far more multi-ethnic than the Partizan paramilitary…" However, I never suggested that the Yugoslav Royal Army was always Serb-dominated, and thus never multi-ethnic; just that it was Serb-dominated, which, by the end of the war, was certainly true. And I doubt that you will doubt that!
Nevertheless, if you feel the need to comment about any article on my blog, feel free to leave a comment at my Balkan Anarchist blog, so I can respond to you quicker.
Pozdrav!
Wednesday, August 24, 2011 12:37:00 PM
__________________________________________________________________________
My article was shared on that same Facebook group on 20th August, 19:30. You can read various comments by some of its members, some slightly positive, while others rather negative. The main criticism being the term "Croatian Serb" itself (discussed previously here), while another commentator branded me an "anti-C[h]etnik" and warned other Serbs to not allow "those who want to make fools of us by trying to cause infighting amongst ourselves".
Like they say, you can't please everyone all the time!
To read my amended Britić article mentioned above, click here: Being a Serb from modern-day Croatia
The Croatian Serb identity has been forged by history and to a great extent by the politics of various rulers from different eras. Fundamentally, it is based on Orthodox Christian faith and culturally represented by numerous customs and traditions, many of them originating from Orthodoxy, while others vary upon region. My people are primarily descendants of Orthodox pastoral warriors (referred to by various names, including 'Vlachs', 'Rascians' and even 'Illyrians'), brought over and settled into the designated Vojna Krajina by the Catholic Habsburg Monarchy in order to repel further attacks and invasions by the Muslim Ottoman Turks into central Europe. Our earliest recorded sightings in modern-day Croatia can be traced to the Middle ages, while our presence continued to grow since then thanks to multiple waves of Orthodox Slavs arriving from the Islamic Ottoman Empire in the 16th and 17th centuries.
Both of these camps fought against the Ustaše, but also against each other, often pitting brother against brother, and even father against son. The war ended with the Partizans' complete victory over German and Italian occupiers and over all rival forces in the country. However, fifty years later came the recent war in Croatia, with many of its roots in the previous world war. This war tragically ended with more than half of the Croatian Serb population previously residing in Croatia in refuge, many of whom fled or were expelled from their homes.
To cut a long story short, this is what happened in the early '90s: during the ethnic tensions that blighted Yugoslavia during the early 90s, the democratically-elected Croatian president Franjo Tuđman (pictured right) declared independence for Croatia from Yugoslavia in 1991 with the support of the majority of ethnic Croats through one national referendum. However, in direct opposition to Croatia's separatism from Yugoslavia, the likewise democratically-elected ethnic Serb leaders from various regions in Croatia also declared their own state in the form of the 'Republika Srpska Krajina' (named after the historical Vojna Krajina mentioned above), with its capital in the North Dalmatian town of Knin, following a number of local referendums with the support of the majority of ethnic Serbs.
After years of intense fighting in certain areas, and numerous war crimes committed by both sides, the war ended tragically for the Serbs of Krajina in August '95, when the Croatian army conducted 'Operation Oluja', a military operation with the aim of capturing and bringing under Croatian rule the western territories of that short-lived state. It was during that time that a huge exodus of around 200,000 Serbs fled across Bosnia into Serbia towards Belgrade during the sweltering summer of that year, accompanied by intimidation and sporadic killings of Serbs in those long refugee columns, and of Serbs who stayed behind in their homes hoping they would be safe. Prior to 'Oluja' was 'Operation Bljesak' in May '95, which was similarly followed by the displacement of at least 15,000 ethnic Serbs. On both sides, there were numerous fatalities, many more wounded and incapacitated people, many psychologically traumatised people, and many people still unaccounted for, i.e. "missing, presumed dead".
As the land that was under Krajina came under Croatian military control thanks to 'Oluja', thousands of Serb houses located within that short-lived state were willfully destroyed: set on fire, grenaded, vandalised, and often looted and ransacked. Those houses that weren't heavily damaged, as was the case with my own property in Lika, were later handed over by Tuđman's régime to Bosnian Croat families, themselves refugees from the Bosnian war, with the aim of permanently altering the demographic structure of towns previously inhabited by ethnic Serb majorities.
Since the war ended, many Serbs have returned to their towns and villages, either to legally reclaim their homes from these Bosnian Croat settlers or to formally apply for them to be repaired or rebuilt by the local authorities. However, in terms of which age bracket most returnees belong to, they have mainly been elderly people, who have nowhere else to go but wish to spend the remainder of their lives in the places they were born and grew up in. It's rarer for younger generations of Serbs to choose to return to these same places, where they were also born, to reside there permanently, especially since there is very little in the way of job opportunities for them to take advantage of. The war-torn regions of Croatia are both physically devastated and economically ruined places, and much of the inhabitants of such regions, known as 'areas of special state concern', live on financial handouts provided to them by the state.
By returning to their homes now under Croatian sovereignty, ethnic Serbs return to a society that openly disregards their suffering during that war — or at least doesn't treat it as equal to that of Croat suffering. The exodus of my people in 1995 at the same time as 'Oluja', which included many of my own relatives from Lika and elsewhere, is considered to be an act of ethnic cleansing. Nevertheless, the victory that 'Oluja' brought by eliminating the state of Krajina is celebrated as a national day of "thanksgiving" every 5th August, marking the end of what in Croatia is officially called the 'Homeland war'. Furthermore, there are still some Croats who question the nature of this exodus of Serbs from Krajina, claiming it was "self-inflicted" and refusing to consider it as equal to the previous ethnic cleansing inflicted upon Croats a few years earlier. Most importantly, the Croatian state has repeatedly denied any responsibility for this exodus; instead, they blame the ethnic Serb rebel leaders of Krajina for organising "evacuations" of the civilian population under their protection.
Following Tuđman's death in 1999, the situation for the Serbian minority in Croatia has improved in a number of ways, particularly in terms of their representation in Croatian public life and media. The most prominent political organisation is the Independent Democratic Serb Party, and its vice-president Milorad Pupovac appears regularly on the news and other TV programmes. Prosvjeta is a cultural society headed by Čedomir Višnjić that hosts a number of Serbian cultural manifestations during the year in different parts of the country, and holds many public forums discussing various issues of concern to Serbs in Croatia. Then there is the Serbian Democratic Forum lead by Veljko Džakula, a non-governmental and non-profit organization founded in 1991, which is dedicated to the promotion of minority rights, the reintegration of returnees and the strengthening of local communities.
Outside of Croatia, Serbia is home to the largest Croatian Serb population in the region, thanks to war-time circumstances. Upon their arrival in 1995, after travelling for days within those miles-long columns, they were placed in refugee camps across Serbia, which are known there as collective centres. A number of them were also settled in Kosovo, as part of Milošević's plan to increase the ethnic Serb presence in the largely ethnic Albanian province. However, Croatian Serbs are largely concentrated in the north of the country, particularly in Novi Sad, the provincial capital of Vojvodina, and in the country's capital Belgrade. They can be also found in large numbers in many towns and villages throughout Vojvodina, and in towns close to Belgrade like Batajnica and Zemun.
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